Airline competition in the British Isles by Alberto A. Gaggero (7195664) & Claudio Piga (7195103)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
   
    
  
ISSN 1750-4171 
 
        
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
Airline Competition in the British Isles 
 
Alberto Gaggero 
Claudio A. Piga 
 
WP 2008 - 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dept Economics 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough  
LE11 3TU  United Kingdom 
Tel:  + 44 (0) 1509 222701 
Fax: + 44 (0) 1509 223910 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec 
           
Airline Competition in the British Isles
Alberto A. Gaggero∗
University of Essex
Claudio A. Piga†
Loughborough University
October 2008
Abstract
We study the relationship between pricing and market structure on
the routes connecting the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Because in
2007 the European Commission prohibited the takeover of Aer Lingus by
Ryanair, the analysis focuses on their pricing strategies in particular. We
use an original dataset of fares posted on-line, which allows to control for
the fares’ intertemporal pattern for each specific flight and each carrier’s
specific yield management system. Our evidence supports the European
Commission’s view that the elimination of a competitor in the Irish airline
market is likely to have harmful consequences for consumers.
Keywords: Ryanair, Aer Lingus, yield management, intertemporal
pricing.
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1 Introduction
Aer Lingus and Ryanair largely dominate the routes departing from the air-
ports located in the Republic of Ireland. In October 2006, Ryanair launched a
take-over bid for Aer Lingus. After an extensive investigation, in June 2007 the
European Competition Commission decided to block the merger, arguing that the
proposed acquisition would increase the market concentration and raise serious
anti-competitive concerns (European Commission, 2007). For instance, out of the
35 intra-European routes operated by both parties, the acquisition would lead to
monopoly in 22 routes, and to a dominant position with a joint market share of
more than 60% on the remaining routes. Furthermore, the econometric evidence
provided by the Commission indicates that the Ryanair’s presence is associated
with Aer Lingus charging around 7-8% lower prices when considering city-pairs
markets, and about 5% lower prices when considering airport-pairs.1 Aer Lingus
prices therefore appear to be constrained by competition from Ryanair. Although
the evidence supporting the related notion of Aer Lingus exerting a competitive
constraint on Ryanair’s prices is weak, the European Commission concluded that
the two carriers were close competitors. Finally, in addition to the elimination
of actual competition, the analysis in European Commission (2007) also points
out to other likely negative impacts: lack of incentive to develop new routes;
elimination of potential competition, in particular with regards to either parties
entering routes where the other is already present; unlikely entry by a third party,
because the enhanced position of the merged entities would make it difficult for
a new entrant to establish a viable competitive presence.
Building on a dataset of on-line posted fares, where for each flight fares are
tracked over about a two months’ period, we pursue two main objectives. First,
we look at whether, in some overlapping routes, fares posted by the one of the
carriers are consistently higher or lower than those posted by the other. Thus, by
looking at fares posted at different points in time, our approach complements the
1A city-pair (e.g., London and Dublin) generally includes more than one route, each
identified by a unique airport-pair combination (e.g., London Heathrow/Dublin and London
Stansted/Dublin).
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analysis in European Commission (2007), where average fares are used. According
to Borenstein and Rose (2007, p.30), business-model experimentation, in pricing,
logistics, competitive strategies and organizational form has been a key feature
of the US airline industry following deregulation. The coexistence of alternative
business models, such as the established full-service model based on the hub-and-
spoke system and the recent low-cost model based on the point-to-point service,
is a recent example (Alderighi et al., 2004). In the present setting, we focus on the
role of revenue management systems, which constitute an important managerial
and strategic tool because they enable a better alignment of the evolution of
actual demand relative to forecast demand for individual flights. They are also
used to implement peak-load pricing and third-degree price discrimination (Dana,
1999). We suggest that the way the two carriers tackle their revenue management
problems may be reflected to a large extent in the inter-temporal profiles of their
fares. Detecting differences in such profiles has important implications on the
way the markets are segmented and therefore on the welfare evaluation of the
takeover.
Second, we conduct a panel data analysis on the routes connecting the Repub-
lic of Ireland to the United Kingdom to evaluate the relationship between pricing
and market structure, as well as the extent to which the absence of one of the
carriers in a route affects the price levels of the other. Relative to the methodol-
ogy employed by the European Commission, we address the simultaneity problem
linking price and market structure by adopting Instrumental Variable techniques
with the instruments proposed in Borenstein (1989) and previously unused vari-
ables. In our analysis, market structure measures are defined both at the route
and the city-pair level. Such a distinction between relevant market definitions
may again be important to assess the competitive effects of a proposed takeover.
Indeed, a monopolistic route may be subject to strong competitive forces when
it represents a product which can be easily substituted with many other routes
in the same city-pair.
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2 The data set
The analysis relies on two main data sets, one containing primary data on posted
fares, the other providing market structure measures derived from secondary data
obtained by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
All the fares were obtained from the internet using a web spider, which
accessed the web-sites of the low-cost carriers (LCCs) included in the sample
(Bmibaby, Mytravellite and Ryanair), and retrieved the fares of the Full Service
Carriers, namely Aer Lingus and British Airways, from an on-line travel agent,
Opodo.2 For each day between 1 June 2003 and 31 December 2004 and for each
flight code, the spider collected all the posted fares that a hypothetical consumer
would pay if she booked her ticket 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70
days3 before the departure day.4 We will refer to these dates as “booking days”.
LCCs price each leg independently and the retrieved fares refer to a single one-
way ticket. Fare data for the Full Service Carriers (FSCs) , instead, reflect a more
sophisticated yield management technique that usually makes it uneconomical for
the consumers to buy each leg independently.5 Therefore, for the FSCs the spider
collected round-trip fares, which could be considered more representative of the
actual fare pattern observed by consumers. Furthermore, because the LCCs’
fares do not include such restrictions as Saturday night stay-over, the spider was
programmed to have the return leg scheduled one week after the outgoing flight.
To make a FSCs round trip fare comparable with a LCC one-way fare, we follow
the traditional approach in the literature to halve the former (Borenstein, 1989;
Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Before we do so, we deal with the fact that each first
leg could be combined with different return flights, each differing by departure
2See www.opodo.co.uk, which is owned and managed by Aer Lingus, Air France, Alitalia,
Austrian Airlines, British Airways, Finnair, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, and the global distribution
system Amadeus. Thus, fares listed on Opodo represent the official prices of each airline;
although Opodo may not report promotional offers that an airline may post on its own website.
3For Aer Lingus and British Airways the series reduces to 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49 and
56.
4See Piga and Bachis (2007), where this same time pattern is used.
5FSCs normally price a round-trip ticket cheaper than two separate one-way tickets, so
that consumers have the incentives to purchase round trip tickets; the airline is thus able to
implement third-degree price discrimination (Giaume and Guillou, 2004).
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time. The spider retrieved all these possible combinations of fares, which we use
to construct a daily average round trip fare.
The UK CAA provided census monthly data for the full set of flights operated
between the UK and Ireland during the period June 2003 - December 2004. This
dataset contains information on the frequency, the number of passengers and the
available seat capacity of each flight code, which were used to construct various
market structure variables. Finally, routes’ distance were taken from the World
Airport Codes’ web site, http://www.world-airport-codes.com.
3 Intertemporal Pricing
As discussed in the Introduction, to shed light on the pricing activities of both Aer
Lingus and Ryanair this paper focuses on the routes connecting the Republic of
Ireland with the United Kingdom. This is an extremely relevant market because,
in the period June 2002 - June 2005, the two carriers accounted for about 63%
to 70% of the traffic between these two countries, although they were present in
about 42% of routes or city-pairs.6 Figure 1 illustrates the temporal fare pattern
in the three routes in our price sample, namely Birmingham-Dublin (BHX-DUB),
Edinburgh-Dublin (EDI-DUB) and Manchester-Dublin (MAN-DUB), that are
both served by Aer Lingus and Ryanair.
In line with the evidence in Piga and Bachis (2007) showing that the FSCs
tend to exhibit a flatter temporal fare pattern than LCCs, Aer Lingus fares are
on average above those of Ryanair for early booking days, but the steep profile
of the latter’s fares suggests that the gap between the two carriers’ fares closes
rapidly as the date of departure approaches and hence indicates that Ryanair’s
fares may be higher just a few days before the take-off.7
To further investigate the nature of the price competition among the the
carriers, we try to evaluate whether one of the carriers consistently prices above
or below the other. To do so, we take into account that flights on the same
6Our price sample covers about a third of all the routes between the two countries.
7Unfortunately, the spider could only retrieve the fares from the on-line travel agent up to
seven days before departure.
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route may be differentiated with respect to the time of departure. Therefore,
we divide a day into four parts and cluster the flights accordingly: Morning (h
6-10), Day (h 10-14), Afternoon (h 14-18) and Evening (h 18-24).8 For each pair
matching flights between Aer Lingus and Ryanair, table 1 reports the proportion
of matched price observations where Ryanair is more expensive than Aer Lingus.9
Overall Ryanair is cheaper than Aer Lingus, especially on morning flights. More
importantly, the analysis based on the inter-temporal price dimension reveals
a pattern consistent with the evidence in Figure 1. Indeed, the likelihood of
Ryanair’s fare being higher than its competitor’s increases as the day of departure
nears.
However, such a finding may be driven by small differences in the two fares
and does not take account of differences in on-board services; in Table 2 a similar
analysis is conducted, although a flight’s fare is considered higher only if it exceeds
the competitor’s fare by at least £10. About 40% of the observations fall into the
indifference band, resulting in lower dispersion than in table 1. Ryanair’s fares are
more likely to be significantly higher than its competitor’s if a flight is operated
in the evening and booked only a few days before departure. Table 1 confirms
that Ryanair’s price advantage shrinks as the departure date approaches.
To sum up, the evidence suggests that during the sample period, the two car-
riers followed a different revenue management approach. As far as the takeover’s
welfare implications are concerned, eliminating one carrier may result in the ac-
quiring company’s revenue management being used exclusively (Dobson and Piga,
2008). More specifically, the analysis seems to indicate that the takeover would
not have affected early bookers but it could have been particularly detrimental to
Aer Lingus’ late booking passengers; while not included in European Commission
(2007), this result supports the decision to block the merger.
8Note that for aviation rules imposed by the Government, there are no flights taking off
between midnight and 6 am.
9The analysis is based on 65 flight codes: 37 operated by Aer Lingus and 28 operated by
Ryanair, for a total of 21,204 matching observations.
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4 Econometric model
To evaluate whether the presence of one carrier (e.g., Ryanair) constrains the
pricing of the other (Aer Lingus), the European Commission (2007) regressed the
average price on a route of the latter carrier against a set of explanatory variables,
including a dummy for the competitor’s presence on the route and other market
structure indicators (See European Commission, 2007, p. 469-477). That is, the
analysis is restricted to the prices of the carriers under study.
In our econometric approach we adopt a different strategy because we pool all
the companies that operate in the markets under consideration. As in European
Commission (2007), we define markets as either an airport-pair (i.e., route) or as
a city-pair. Given the differentiated nature of airlines’ products, using the route
as the relevant market concept is a sound econometric strategy only if each route
is not a viable substitute for travelers. When consumers perceive two routes
belonging to the same city-pair as, to some extent, substitutes, using market
structure variables defined at the city-pair level produces more reliable estimates.
Since we cannot determine the extent to which the markets under consideration
are differentiated, we estimate both types of models.
The econometric model we use to study the relationship between pricing and
market structure is expressed by the following equation:
lnPit = αi + µ1MSi + µ2HHIi + µ3onlyEIi + µ4onlyFRi +
+θ1Departimei + θ2Arr/Depi + θ3Bdayit + ρ1ln(Distance)i +
+pi1Xmasi + pi2Easteri + pi3StPatricki +
+δ1Companyi + δ2Monthi + δ3DayWeeki + εit, (1)
where lnPit denotes the log of the weekly mean fare for each flight code i.
10
In order to track the evolution of each flight’s fare over time, the subscript t
denotes the booking days.11 The regressors are grouped into different categories:
10Each fare is net of airport taxes and surcharges.
11So, for example, the flight code FR507 departing on 1 June 2003 is considered as one panel
observed at booking days 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70.
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(i) µ coefficients indicate market structure variables, (ii) θ coefficients refer to
flight and fare characteristics, (iii) ρ coefficients denote the cost factors, (iv) pi
coefficients account for demand factors, (v) δ coefficients correspond to a set of
additional dummies. Finally εit is the white noise regression error, and αi is a
random, panel specific, intercept.
The market structure variables on which we focus the attention are defined
as follows:
• Route/City Market Share (MS), calculated using the number of flights op-
erated by a company in either a route or a city-pair over the total number
of flights;12
• Route/City Herfindahl Index (HHI), calculated from the market shares de-
scribed above;
• onlyEI: dummy equals one if Aer Lingus operates and Ryanair does not
operate on the observed route.13
• onlyFR: dummy equals one if Ryanair operates and Aer Lingus does not
operate on the observed route/city-pair.
Fares are expected to be positively related to both MS and HHI. The coeffi-
cients of onlyEI and onlyFR, if positive, should provide insights to the extent by
which the presence of a competitor constitutes a constraint to the pricing activity
of the other. A definition of the other control variables listed in equation (1) can
be found in the Appendix.
Another point of departure of the present analysis from the one conducted by
European Commission (2007) lies in the use of Instrumental Variable methods
to account for the potential correlation of the market structure variables with
12Number of flights and number of passengers are highly correlated variables. We use the
former because it is decided by the carriers well in advance of the traveling period, and is
therefore to be considered as a pre-determined variable which is not simultaneously chosen
with price.
13Note that we do not have any case in which Aer Lingus does not face Ryanair on a city-pair
and therefore onlyEI cannot be defined at the city-pair level.
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the error term εit (i.e., the fact that the market structure variables may be si-
multaneously determined with price.14) Following a traditional approach in the
literature, the Market Shares and the Herfindhal Indices are instrumented using
the variables adopted in Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose (1994). More
precisely, Market Share is instrumented by the ratio between the observed car-
rier’s geometric mean of enplanements at the endpoints of a route and the sum
across all carriers of the geometric mean of each carrier’s enplanements at the
endpoints. The Herfindhal Index is instrumented with a quasi-HHI, denoted as
I HHI, that sums together the fitted value of the observed carrier’s MS, M̂S (ob-
tained from an auxiliary regression of MS on its instrument and all the exogenous
right-hand side variables), with the re-scaled HHI of the traffic that is left to be
divided among other carriers. In formula: I HHI = M̂S
2
+ (HHI−HMS2) (1−M̂S)2
(1−MS)2 .
We construct our own set of instruments for onlyEI and onlyFR: they are
respectively defined as the sum of the number of flights operated by the competi-
tor at each endpoints of the route or city. For instance, for onlyFR we use the
sum of all Aer Lingus’ flights landing at each endpoints of a route/city-pair. The
identifying criterion draws from the assumption used in Berry (1992), Morrison
and Winston (1990) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) that entry in a route
is more likely if a competitor already operates from at least one of the route’s
endpoints.
5 Results
Equation (1) is estimated using the Random Effect (RE) estimator. Since the
variables of interest are MS, HHI and the two dummies onlyEI and onlyFR,
these are included one at the time (with the exception of the joint use of onlyEI
and onlyFR) in our regressions to avoid collinearity problems. Furthermore,
because each of them captures one specific feature of the market, Tables 3 and
14The Commission acknowledges the concern and ”... tested a number of candidate instru-
ments included in the data set, such as intra-route frequency rank, own costs or own total
frequencies at destination airport. However all these instruments turned out to have very poor
properties.” (European Commission, 2007, page 485).
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4 report the estimates of equation (1) when markets are defined respectively as
routes or city-pairs.
As far as the variables controlling for market structure are concerned, the two
tables present striking differences. When the market share and the Herfindhal
index are defined at the route level, their coefficients are both negative, but
become positive (and produce a larger economic effect in absolute terms) when
city-pair markets are considered instead. Such a difference may be driven by the
poor performance of the instruments, which at the route level may be not able
to vary sufficiently to purge the effects that unobserved variables have on both
fares and market shares (or the HHI). For instance, small potential demand at
the route level may induce both high levels of route concentration due to the
high fixed costs of operating in a route and also low prices (hence the negative
coefficients in Table 3). A firm that is a monopolist in a small route cannot mark
fares up if it faces competition from other carriers operating in other routes of
the same city-pair (hence the positive correlation between low concentration and
low fares). Considering that the city-pair coefficients also produce a better fit for
the data (R2 is about 0.34 while it is about 0.29 when markets are defined at
the route level), we conclude that high market shares and high levels of market
concentrations appear to be positively associated with observed fares, to the
extent that their increase by 10% leads to fares that are, respectively, about 2.6%
and 3.5% higher. Further support to the hypothesis that lack of competition is
associated with the exercise of some degree of market power in the British-Irish
airline market is found by looking at the coefficient of the dummy onlyFR, which
at the city-pair level is equal to 0.16. This implies that when Ryanair does not
compete with Aer Lingus on the same city-pair, its fares are about 17.4% higher.15
Always with regards to the coefficients in Table 4, we set Ryanair’s company
15The percentage numbers stem from the formula in Wooldridge (2005):
100 ∗ [exp(β̂)− 1]
which calculates the marginal effect in percentage terms of a dummy variable when the
dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic form; β̂ is the estimated coefficient of the dummy
variable.
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dummy as base dummy. Therefore, the variable denoted as “Aer Lingus” mea-
sures to what extent Aer Lingus’ fares differ in magnitude from Ryanair’s ones.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that Aer Lingus con-
sistently prices higher than Ryanair, on average by 31%.
All the remaining regressors behave as expected. Distance, which is positive
and statistically significant, proves to be a good approximation of operating, and
fuel in particular, costs. Indeed taking the log captures the economies of scale of
operating longer routes, since landing and take-off are fuel-intensive operations.
The holiday dummies are positive and statistically significant, indicating that
flying during a holiday period is on average more expensive. Note also that the
increasing magnitude of the coefficients from StPatrick to Xmas is exactly in
line with what one would expect: the magnitude of coefficients seems to accord
with the relative importance of each festivity. Indeed, the largest price hikes are
observed during Christmas, followed by Easter and St Patrick.
The coefficients of the booking day dummies (“Booking Day 4” to “Book-
ing Day 70”) define an interesting, albeit largely expected, pattern. With the
“Booking Day 1” as the omitted category, the other twelve booking day dum-
mies are negative and statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that the
early bookers on average obtain better deals. Note also that the coefficient on
these dummies remains stable around -1.6 until the last month before the depar-
ture, then it smoothly declines as the departure day approaches. The evidence
is therefore consistent with the view that fares increase monotonically over time.
Using a larger sample, Piga and Bachis (2007) show how this property generally
holds when fares are averaged over a predetermined sample period (say, a week
or month), but it is likely to be violated when one investigates the fares of in-
dividual flights over time. That is, it is often observed that, for the same flight,
fares posted between, say, one month and twenty days from departure may be
lower than those posted prior to that period. Generally, however, very late fares
(those posted within a week of departure) are the highest, in order to signal the
carriers’ commitment to high fares in the days immediately preceding a flight’s
take-off, and thus discourage strategic buyers’ behavior.
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6 Conclusion
The analysis in Dobson and Piga (2008) indicates that Ryanair’s successful at-
tempt in 2003 to take over another low-cost carrier, Buzz, generally led to lower
fares, increased flight frequency on the acquired routes and higher quality in
the form of improved punctuality performance, and suggests that it may have
therefore benefitted consumers. Nonetheless, in 2007 the European Commission,
after the extensive investigation carried out by its competition authorities, de-
cided to block the takeover by Ryanair on the other main player in the Irish
airline market, Aer Lingus. The European Commission’s concerns about the in-
creased market power of the acquiring firm and particularly diminished choice for
Irish consumers appear to have overridden the possible opposing benefits from
Ryanair’s application of its highly successful low-cost business model, which could
have been applied for the first time to the intercontinental routes that Aer Lingus
operates.16
The evidence in this paper generally lends support to the European Commis-
sion’s decision. First, we show that the elimination of a competitor when carriers
follow different revenue management methods is likely to harm certain segments
of consumers (in this particular case, those with uncertain demand whose need
to book a flight is generally revealed just a few days prior to a flight’s departure).
Second, the econometric exercise with instrumental variables reveals that fares
are higher in the British-Irish concentrated city-pair markets, or in markets with
firms with high market shares. Considering that in many routes the takeover
would have led to a pure monopolistic structure at the route level, and therefore
to an increase of concentration at the city-pair level, it is not unrealistic to assume
that the takeover could have exacerbated the exercise of market power highlighted
by our analysis.
Third, in line with the analysis in European Commission (2007), we do find
that the presence of one carrier constrains the pricing behavior of the other.
16A distinctive difference between the two target companies, Aer Lingus and Buzz, is that the
former has strongly opposed the takeover, while the latter was consensually sold by its holding
company, KLM.
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With the coming of age of the European liberalization process which has rad-
ically changed the configuration of the airline industry by favoring the emergence
of the Low-Cost Carriers, the consolidation of some legacy carriers (think of the
Air France-KLM and the BA-Iberia mergers) and the collapse of others (Ali-
talia, Sabena, Swiss Air), it is not unlikely that the two main players in the Irish
airline market, Ryanair and Aer Lingus, will find themselves involved in other
takeover attempts, both among themselves or other carriers. More takeover at-
tempts may be simply driven by the need to cut costs, intensify scale and density
economies and manage the high, and permanent, volatility of fuel prices. Our
analysis suggests that to be equipped to provide effective evaluations of a merger
bid’s effects, a systematic collection of fares and market structure information is
essential. Therefore, an attempt to construct a fares’ database at the European
level similar to the one produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation (the
Airline Origin and Destination Survey DB1B) should be given consideration by
policymakers.17
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Appendix: description of the independent vari-
ables
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Departime Time of a flight’s take-off, decoded into four dummies:
Morning (h 6-10), Mday (h 10-14), Afternoon (h 14-18),
Evening (h 18-24). Morning is the base category.
Arr/Dep dummy equal one if the itinerary originates in UK and
zero if it originates in the Republic of Ireland.
Booking day number of days separating the departure date from
the day the fare was retrieved. It assumes values
1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70
and is decoded with a set of dummy variables, one for each
booking day category. The base dummy is 1 day.
ln(Distance) logarithm of the distance between the two endpoints
of a route in 100 km.
Xmas dummy variable equal to one if the flight is operated
during the weeks of Xmas/New Year, and zero otherwise.
Easter dummy variable equals to one if the flight is operated
during the week of Easter, and zero otherwise.
StPatrick dummy variable equals to one if the flight is operated
during the week of St. Patrick’s festival, and zero otherwise.
Company set of airline dummies, Ryanair is the omitted company.
Month set of month dummies
DayWeek set of day-of-the-week dummies.
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Table 1: Share of Ryanair’s fares that are higher than Aer Lingus’
BHX-DUB EDI-DUB MAN-DUB
Frequency Obs. Frequency Obs. Frequency Obs.
Departure Time
Morning 27.8% 2,605 29.8% 1,317 15.7% 2,421
Day 37.4% 2,529 30.8% 2,224
Afternoon 25.0% 895 54.2% 419 20.3% 2,263
Evening 46.1% 2,629 46.2% 1,566 25.0% 2,335
Booking Day
56 days 31.7% 520 45.3% 202 21.6% 515
49 days 26.1% 1,088 57.9% 446 21.4% 1,142
42 days 27.6% 1,139 42.1% 461 20.3% 1,208
35 days 30.5% 1,173 39.1% 461 18.9% 1,220
28 days 32.1% 1,211 37.5% 459 16.8% 1,265
21 days 35.9% 1,189 35.4% 444 19.8% 1,309
14 days 43.5% 1,215 38.1% 428 25.7% 1,315
10 days 54.5% 571 43.1% 204 32.1% 633
7 days 59.4% 552 46.5% 198 41.8% 636
Total 35.9% 8,658 40.7% 3,303 22.8% 9,243
17
Table 2: Likelihood that Ryanair’s fares differ by at least £10 from Aer Lingus’
Difference FR fares EI fares Number
in fares at least £10 at least £10 of
within £10 more than EI more than FR Obs.
Departure Time
Morning 36.6% 10.3% 53.1% 6,343
Day 44.8% 13.8% 41.4% 4,754
Afternoon 38.0% 11.2% 50.8% 3,577
Evening 39.1% 21.2% 39.7% 6,530
Booking Day
56 days 36.6% 14.6% 48.8% 1,237
49 days 39.7% 11.3% 49.0% 2,676
42 days 39.2% 11.6% 49.2% 2,808
35 days 40.9% 9.9% 49.2% 2,854
28 days 39.4% 11.2% 49.3% 2,935
21 days 39.0% 13.3% 47.8% 2,942
14 days 38.6% 18.3% 43.2% 2,958
10 days 42.0% 23.5% 34.5% 1,408
7 days 39.2% 29.7% 31.2% 1,386
Total 39.4% 14.6% 46.0% 21,204
EI and FR are short for Aer Lingus and Ryanair respectively.
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Table 3: Instrumental Variable Estimates with markets defined at route level.
Dependent Variable: Log of mean weekly fares
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Route Market Share -0.21
Route Herfindhal Index -0.07
onlyEI 0.68
onlyFR -0.23
log(Distance) 0.60 0.56 0.39
Aer Lingus 0.65 0.67 0.16
Booking Day 4 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56
Booking Day 7 -1.32 -1.32 -1.32
Booking Day 10 -1.46 -1.46 -1.46
Booking Day 14 -1.87 -1.87 -1.87
Booking Day 21 -2.07 -2.07 -2.07
Booking Day 28 -2.11 -2.11 -2.11
Booking Day 35 -2.02 -2.02 -2.02
Booking Day 42 -1.98 -1.98 -1.98
Booking Day 49 -2.04 -2.04 -2.04
Booking Day 56 -2.09 -2.09 -2.09
Booking Day 63 -2.07 -2.07 -2.07
Booking Day 70 -2.00 -2.00 -2.01
Xmas 0.84 0.84 0.84
Easter 0.47 0.47 0.47
StPatrick 0.19 0.19 0.18
R2 0.29 0.29 0.27
Observations 135,468 135,468 135,468
Note: All the variables described in the Appendix were included, but are not reported to save
space. All coefficients statistically significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable Estimates with markets defined at city-pair level.
Dependent Variable: Log of mean weekly fares
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
City Market Share 0.26
City Herfindhal Index 0.35
onlyFR City 0.16
log(Distance) 0.30 0.31 0.27
Aer Lingus 0.28 0.27 0.26
Booking Day 4 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42
Booking Day 7 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95
Booking Day 10 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09
Booking Day 14 -1.34 -1.34 -1.34
Booking Day 21 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52
Booking Day 28 -1.59 -1.59 -1.59
Booking Day 35 -1.59 -1.59 -1.59
Booking Day 42 -1.59 -1.59 -1.59
Booking Day 49 -1.61 -1.61 -1.61
Booking Day 56 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65
Booking Day 63 -1.66 -1.66 -1.66
Booking Day 70 -1.64 -1.64 -1.64
Xmas 0.55 0.55 0.54
Easter 0.25 0.25 0.25
StPatrick 0.14 0.14 0.14
R2 0.34 0.35 0.34
Observations 135,468 135,468 135,468
Note: All the variables described in the Appendix were included, but are not reported to save
space. All coefficients statistically significant at 1% level.
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Figure 1: Fares temporal profile in overlapping routes.
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